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Capitalism, Regulation Theory and Australian Labour Law:
Towards a New Theoretical Model
Brett Heino
University of Wollongong, Faculty of Law, Humanities & the Arts
Abstract: This article employs the methodology of the Parisian Regulation Approach to
periodise Australian capitalism into distinct models of development. Within such models,
labour law plays a key role in articulating the abstract capitalist need to commodify labourpower with the concrete realities of class struggle. Given the differential ordering of social
contradictions and the distinct relationship of social forces within the fabric of each model of
development, such formations will crystallise distinct regimes of labour law.

This is

demonstrated by a study of the two successive models of development which characterised
Australian political economy since the post-World War II era; antipodean Fordism (1945mid-1970s) and liberal-productivism (late-1980s-present). The result of this examination is a
model of legal analysis that, although tailored to the Australian experience, is capable of
application in other contexts.
Introduction
The end of the post-World-War II ‘long boom’ in the mid-1970s proved the beginning of a
process of political-economic change that has fundamentally altered and reformulated the
institutions of Australian industrial relations, particularly the regime of labour law which
underpins them. Labour law during the boom unified a permissive attitude towards organised
labour, bargaining between capital and labour at a broad occupational level, a series of
institutions which diffused wage gains from leading sectors and the growth of administrative
fixes to heightened worker power. From the mid-1980s onwards, however, this regime was

usurped by another which combines hostility to trade unions, a destruction of the conciliation
and arbitration system, a severing of the institutional links homogenising the wage structure
and associating productivity and wage growth and an intensified juridification on the back of
the increased valency of market forces.
Despite the significance of this shift, the nature of legal change remains poorly theorised.
Both labour law and industrial relations remain disciplines beholden to a distinctly empiricist
method (Treuren, 1997a: 59; 2000: 75). Even the development within Australian scholarship
of the ‘Labour Market Regulation Approach’ (see, for example Arup et al, 2006) has largely
failed to provide a rigorous account of the political economy of legal change beyond the
recognition that neo-liberalism has materially altered the parameters of industrial relations
(Quinlan, 2006: 21-42). This inability to explain the articulations between legal change and
the deep structures of Australian capitalism is apparent even in broader political economy
work that explicitly seeks to do so (such as Mack, 2005). Here, the source of the poor
theorisation of legal change is not so much an empiricist method as a static conception of law
as an element of a reactive superstructure (forewarned by Pashukanis, 1978: 53-55; Collins,
1982: 30-34; for notable exceptions in the Australian setting, see Fraser, 1978; Wells, 1989).
Similarly, and although generative of much discussion, conceptual and methodological flaws
dog more recent approaches to the study of labour law institutions, such as the ‘Varieties of
Capitalism’ (VOC) and ‘Legal Origins’ (LO) schools.
What is necessary for a rigorous account of labour law development, and legal change more
broadly, is a Marxist analysis that reconciles both the abstract and concrete functions and
structures of law within the capitalist mode of production. Although there are a variety of
important contributions to a Marxist theory of the law (see, for example, Renner, 1949;
Pashukanis, 1978; Fraser, 1978; Kay & Mott, 1982; Fine, 1984; Miéville, 2006),i most have
tended to emphasise the abstract place of law within capitalism. Although perhaps partly a

function of the abstract language which characterised many of the Marxist debates of the
1970s and 1980s, the more important determinant of this focus would appear to be the lack of
a sophisticated, nuanced account of capitalist change and evolution. If one cannot understand
the unfolding of capitalism’s abstract tendencies into disparate concrete forms, any account
of law must perforce operate at the abstract level and, in so doing, elide the complexity of
capital’s temporal existence.
The Parisian Regulation Approach (PRA) is the body of theory which has most fruitfully
tackled the task of explaining the dialectical relationship between capitalism’s abstract
tendencies and concrete structures. As we shall explore in greater detail below, the PRA
represents an effort to generate an intermediate level analysis of capitalist development that,
whilst taking the methodological lead from Marx, employs discrete concepts operating at a
lower level of abstraction (Neilson, 2012: 160). If it were unified with the more sophisticated
works of Marxist jurisprudence, such as Pashukanis (1978), Kay & Mott (1982) and Fine
(1984), the PRA would be a tool of considerable analytic power in understanding how the
tendencies and contradictions of capital are differentially inscribed in the legal form as part of
distinct epochs of capitalist development. Unfortunately, however, the potential of the PRA
for legal analysis appears almost entirely untapped. The author was unable to find any
examples of explicitly legal study from a regulationist perspective. In Australia, this
shortcoming is doubled, given that the PRA has, barring a few significant exceptions
(Broomhill, 2008; Lloyd, 2002, 2008; Heino, 2013), made little headway in Australian
political economy scholarship.
It is into this lacuna that this article steps. Drawing upon the methodology of the PRA, this
article periodises Australian political economy since World War II into two models of
development, historically specific crystallisations of capitalist social relations unifying an
industrial paradigm, accumulation regime and mode of regulation (Lipietz, 1992: 1-3). These

models, whilst derived from regulationist ideal-typical frameworks, have been sensitised to
the Australian context and thus display a unique institutional materiality and distinctive
trajectories of crisis. The models identified are antipodean Fordism (1945-mid-1970s) and
liberal-productivism (mid-1980s-present), separated by a period of crisis characterised by
‘institutional searching’ to navigate an escape therefrom (Heino, 2013: 160). Each model
possesses an order of labour law appropriate to it, depending upon the differential articulation
of the contradictions of capitalist social relations, the integration of organised labour, the
valency of market forces and the diffusion of the commodity form. These orders are not
passive, functional responses to the needs of capital. Instead, they are historically contingent
structures in which the abstract function of the commodification of labour-power (Kay &
Mott, 1982: 110-114) is buffeted by class struggle and the attempt to impress the competing
political economies of labour and capital upon the legal form (Lebowitz, 2003: 77-100).
This demonstration will hopefully serve two purposes; one of focus and one of concept.
Regarding the former, this paper will introduce to the readers of Capital & Class an
Australian perspective on labour law change and PRA models, which has hitherto remained
unexplored, both within this journal and generally. Turning to the latter, the theoretical
understanding developed here, although tailored to the Australian experience, can be retroengineered by modifying its more concrete concepts. In this way, it can be applied to other
Fordist/liberal-productivist societies specifically, whilst the general union of the PRA and
Marxist jurisprudence can be extended to other epochs outside of this conjuncture.
The Parisian regulation approach: an overview and key concepts
Readers of Capital & Class will no doubt be aware of the genealogy of the PRA and the
debates that have arisen around its epistemology, concepts and methods.ii However, given

that I, following Neilson (2012), argue for the need to return the PRA to its roots in a
thoroughly Marxist political economy,iii it is necessary to revisit this history briefly.
The PRA emerged in France in the late-1970s, stemming from Aglietta’s (1979) pathbreaking account of the development of American capitalism.

Derived from structural

Marxism, it nevertheless rejected the Althusserian conception of social reproduction as quasiautomatic (Jessop & Sum, 2006: 37).

Instead, regulationists emphasised the inherently

improbable character of capital accumulation; a function of the contradictions inscribed in
capitalist social relations (Jessop & Sum, 2006: 37). The necessary question in light of this
characterisation was how capitalism could be made stable for periods of time, as was the case
in the post-War decades.
The answer was regulation. Capital accumulation, and the tendential laws governing it, can
be guided and regularised through a contingent, historically variant combination of economic
and extra-economic factors in a distinctive institutional matrix, vitiating, deferring or
displacing the various contradictions encoded in capitalism’s DNA and reproducing the
capitalist mode of production (Aglietta, 1979: 15-17; Tickell & Peck, 1995: 360).

As

Aglietta (1979: 16) states ‘The study of capitalist regulation...is the study of the
transformation of social relations as it creates new forms that are both economic and
noneconomic, that are organized in structures and themselves reproduce a determinant
structure, the mode of production.’
Such institutional fixes to the paradoxes of capitalist social relations achieve only a
provisional and temporary measure of success. Regulation cannot absolve capitalism of its
contradictions; indeed, the attempt to regulate particular paradoxes tends to exacerbate others,
unleashing disequilibria which ultimately undermine the coherence of any particular
regulatory phase (Tickell & Peck, 1995: 360; Harvey, 2010: 119-139). The resultant crisis

threatens the stability and sustainability of capital accumulation, which can only be restored
with the development of new regulatory structures and norms.
Regulationists have developed a set of sophisticated concepts to explain the constituent
structures of a system en régulation. These are an:


Industrial paradigm-a dominant model of labour process organisation, governing the
social and technical division of labour. A prime example is mass-production on semiautomatic assembly lines (Aglietta, 1979: 116-122);



Accumulation regime-a macro-level articulation of production and consumption
reproducible over a long-period (Jessop, 2013: 8). Depending upon its articulation of
Department 1 (producing means of production) and Department 2 (producing means
of consumption), such a regime can be extensive or intensive (Aglietta, 1979: 71-72);



Mode of regulation-an ensemble of norms and institutions that can stabilise an
accumulation regime (Jessop & Sum, 2006: 42). It includes the form of the wagelabour-nexus, state structures, modalities of competition, the money form and
insertion into the international economy; and



Model of development-a coherent combination of an industrial paradigm,
accumulation regime and mode of regulation (Lipietz, 1992: 1-3).

With the notion of a model of development, the PRA is ideally placed to deliver a mid-range
Marxist account of the evolution of capitalism in all its national guises (Neilson, 2012: 160).
As described previously, this potential has remained largely untapped within Australian
scholarship. This is particularly unfortunate for labour law and industrial relations work,
given the analytical sophistication the PRA could infuse into study in these areas (Treuren,
1997b: 362). By elucidating not only the correlation between economic and extra-economic
forces, but the actual modes of their articulation and co-constitution within evolving capitalist

social relations, the PRA opens the way to a more holistic understanding of contemporary
issues in industrial relations and labour law. Armed with PRA methodology and concepts,
we can see the developments in these fields as the result of both the structural tendencies of
the abstract capitalist mode of production and the contingency of its concrete forms; a useful
rejoinder to the identified shortcomings of analysis.
Indeed, it is in acknowledging the dialectical relationship between the abstract and the
concrete that the PRA represents a significant advance over contemporary approaches to
labour law change, such as VOC and LO. Whilst the former acknowledges the role of law
generally, and labour law specifically, in differentiating between different national
capitalisms (typologised broadly as ‘liberal market economies’ and ‘coordinated market
economies’; Hall & Soskice, 2001), it takes as its conceptual foundation the relational firm,
rather than the contradictions of capitalist social relations. Although outlining well enough
the role law plays in constituting work relations in stationary societies, VOC lacks an account
of endogenous social change (Boyer, 2005: 539); it is therefore incapable of describing legal
development in response to the developing tendencies and contradictions of capitalism. The
LO is even more static, describing the nature of labour regulation as a function of a country’s
legal history, namely whether it belongs to the common or civil law tradition (Botero et al,
2004). Considering the time-scale involved, LO demands deep path-dependencies (Ahlering
& Deakin, 2007: 867) that verge on legal determinism. Such an approach is even more
unsuited than VOC in accounting for legal change within the past several decades, and both
compare poorly to the PRA’s utility in this endeavour.
As identified previously, most Marxist accounts of the law are also insufficient in the task of
explaining legal change, albeit for different reasons. These will be addressed in greater detail
when we come to outline labour law under capitalism more specifically.

Fordism and liberal-productivism: ideal-typical models
Using the above concepts, regulationists have generated ideal-typical models of development.
The model for which the PRA is most well-known (or perhaps notorious) is Fordism.
Fordism has variously been used to describe a labour process, an accumulation regime, a
mode of regulation or model of development. Although conceptual slippage sometimes dogs
regulationist work, most of the confusion arises outside of a regulationist paradigm (Boyer,
1990: ix-xix; Hampson, 1991: 115, 122-124). We must thus unfold this notion precisely.
According to Lipietz (1992: 3-7), the Fordist model of development combined a Taylorist,
mechanised labour process paradigm within large, multi-department firms, an autocentric
mass production/mass consumption intensive accumulation regime synthesizing full
employment with rising productivity and real wages, and a mode of regulation involving a
redistributivist welfare state that guaranteed effective demand through protective social
legislation and the generalisation of mass consumption norms. This model provides a
substantive understanding of the physiology of the post-War boom, particularly its
mechanisms of coherence and potentialities for crisis.iv
Due to a combination of inter-related features, including the exhaustion of productivity
growth in lead sectors, resistance of workers to intensified exploitation, the
internationalisation of production and the erosion of US hegemony (Braverman, 1974: 31-35;
Aglietta, 1979: 119-122; De Vroey, 1984: 55-63; Lipietz, 1992: 14-23), Fordism began to
lose coherence from the early-1970s onwards, reflected in high inflation, growing
unemployment and stumbling productivity growth. This period extended into the 1980s, and
was characterised by ‘institutional searching’ to escape the growing crisis and restore stable
accumulation (Heino, 2013: 160).

In the early to mid-1980s, the ideology of neo-liberalism progressively imposed an
intellectual order upon these unfolding events (Jessop, 1988: 163) and armed capital with the
resources to attempt to shape a new model of development. Of course, purposive action often
leads to unintended results in complex social systems, whilst accidental discoveries and
experiments can produce institutions of unexpected functionality (Lipietz, 1987). Moreover,
the program of capital had to contend with the political economy of labour, which is
dialectically entwined with, but distinct from, that of capital’s (Lebowitz, 2003: 77-100).
However, by the late 1980s to early 1990s, the elements of a new model had come into
existence. These cohered into a system Lipietz (2013) dubs liberal-productivism. This
model unifies a fractured industrial paradigm (which combines the extension and
intensification of Taylorism in the tertiary sector with islands of ‘negotiated involvement’ on
the part of workers) with an intensive accumulation regime that disassociates real wages and
productivity (and is thus debt-fuelled) and a neo-liberal mode of regulation in an increasingly
complex global division of labour (Lipietz, 2013: 129-130) This system remains on foot
today, although the Global Financial Crisis arguably represented the beginnings of its
terminal crisis (Ivanova, 2011:330).
Each model structured the various contradictions of capitalist social relations in a distinct
fashion. Whereas Fordism took the wage-labour nexus as the site of primary contradiction
(institutionalising wages as a source of effective demand and integration of organised labour
as conducive to social stability: Jessop, 2013: 14), liberal-productivism both inverts this
nexus (conceiving of wages as a cost of international production) whilst transfiguring
capitalism’s other contradictions (such as substituting competition in place of monopolist
regulation: Jessop & Sum, 2006: 329-331). Each model thus represents an historically
conditioned crystallisation of the contradictions of capitalist social relations.

It is important to note that these ideal-typical models are the result of a process of abstraction
which, in the manner of Marx, ‘brings out and fixes the common element’ but apprehends ‘no
real historical stage’ (Marx, 1973: 85-88). The ideal-typical model of development does not
describe the concrete experience of any particular society. Rather, as Treuren (1997a: 60-61)
notes, it forms a vital intermediate link in the movement from abstract to concrete. It enters
into a dialectical relationship with concrete existence in which the model identifies causal
relationships whilst empirical study comments on the adequacy of the theoretical construct
(Treuren, 1997a: 61).
Thus, these models need sensitising to the Australian context if they are to fulfil their
analytical potential (Treuren, 1997b: 362, 366). Similar modification will be necessary in
applying these categories to any other concrete society falling within the Fordist/liberalproductivist ideal-types.
Antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism
Applying the stylised features of Fordism to the Australian experience of the post-War boom
reveals a model of development that, whilst recognisably Fordist, modifies some of its key
abstract components. The Australian incarnation of Fordism combined:


An industrial paradigm based on mass production but marked by an incomplete
incorporation of Taylorist forms of work control and organisation (Wright, 1993)
with;



An intensive accumulation regime of mass production and mass consumption which
was not autarkic; that is, it was premised upon the ability of the export-oriented
farming and mining sectors to underwrite high levels of industrial protection (Bell &
Head, 1994: 10-13); and



A mode of regulation that precociously enshrined the Fordist wage-labour nexus in
the arbitration system. This mode, although guaranteed by a Keynesian Welfare
National State (KWNS), was characterised by the unification of that state’s economic
and social objectives/functions (Castles, 1994: 123-124).

The author has dubbed this model of development antipodean Fordism (a term coined by
Rolfe, 2003, who, however, uses it as a vague cultural construct: Heino, 2014). It builds
upon the features of the ‘Australian mode of development’ Treuren (1997b: 366) hinted at
whilst more clearly systematising it in line with discrete PRA concepts.v
Unlike Fordism, the liberal-productivist ideal-typical model requires less modification to
capture the Australian experience, given the fact that it is constituted by an explicitly global
production system that corrodes the ability of states to control a nationally bounded economic
and political space (Lipietz, 1992: 43-46; Jessop, 1997: 303-306, 2013: 8-9). Although
important continuities with antipodean Fordism are present (like the reliance upon primary
commodity exports and a dependence on foreign capital), it is in liberal-market economies
like Australia, the US and UK that liberal-productivism has found purest expression (Jessop,
2013: 16; he uses the term ‘finance-driven accumulation’).
Now that the features of antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism are in hand, we can
move to a consideration of the labour law regimes that characterised them. We must first,
however, gain an understanding of labour law within capitalist society generally. Although it
has been necessary to first outline the contours of the PRA and its novel application to the
Australian context, the proper starting point for any investigation into the structure and
dynamic of labour law must begin with capitalist social relations in the abstract.vi It is to
these we now turn.
A method of legal analysis

Beginning the analysis into the structure and function of labour law within the capitalist mode
of production means immediately encountering the main lines of debate within Marxism
concerning a distinct theory of the law. As alluded to previously, a crude, instrumentalist
Marxism would regard law merely as capital’s class power cloaked in an ideological veil
(Collins, 1982: 29-30; Heino, 2013: 151). Although law undoubtedly plays an ideological
role, such a view is incapable of explaining why power relations take a legal form
(Pashukanis, 1978: 74-75) and how protective legislation, such as occupational health and
safety and unfair dismissal statutes, comes into being.
More sophisticated Marxist legal analysis rejects instrumentalism, instead locating the legal
form as deeply implanted within capitalist social relations. Pashukanis (1978) developed a
brilliant but flawed account of the formal equality and ostensible neutrality of bourgeois
law,vii a juridical product giving effect to the proprietary recognition needed for commodity
exchange. Following Pashukanis’ lead, derivationist theorists sought to logically derive the
forms and functions of the capitalist state, including its juridical order, from the structure of
the capital relation (see, for example, Holloway & Picciotto, 1978). Law was broadly
conceived in Pashukanis’ terms, except that its formal equality and fetishistic positing of
individuals as de-classed juridical equals was more explicitly located within capitalist
production, as opposed to exchange, relations (Blanke, Jürgens & Kastendiek, 1978). The
less sophisticated examples of this approach tended to assume the functionality of the forms
so derived. Moreover, the derivation exercise itself was largely static, a one-dimensional
account of law as the manifestation of capital’s tendencies (see, for example, Altvater, 1978).
As Jessop (1988: 155) describes, however, other derivationist work problematized the
relationship between form and function and, in so doing, admitted of a more dynamic
relationship binding the two. Although the former may broadly be inscribed in capitalist
social relations, the contradictions that generate these forms constantly undercut their

effectiveness whilst generating pressures they cannot adequately contain. Indeed, as
Althusser (1977) and Jessop (2013) have noted, these contradictions are internally variegated,
such that different poles of each contradiction (including those that determine the legal
regime) assume varying weight in different historical conjunctures. Moreover, capitalist
class relations, and the structures and experiences that constitute them, produce a proletarian
political economy that, although dialectically entwined with that of capital’s, is nevertheless
distinct from it (Lebowitz, 2003: 77-100).
What a rigorous Marxist theory of law must accomplish then, is a dual movement that both
recognises the roots of the abstract legal form within capitalist social relations whilst at the
same time accounting for the overdetermination of its concrete manifestations. This process
would begin by tracing the most abstract features of the legal form within the capitalist mode
of production. These features are to be considered the structural horizons of capitalist law,
determining broadly what it can and cannot be whilst at the same time affording a wide space
for the historical contingency consequent upon the interactions and overdeterminations of
capitalism’s tendencies. Moving down the hierarchy of abstraction, and following Jessop
(2013), the next step in the analysis would involve ascertaining how these forms are ordered
and hierarchized within distinct epochs of development. It is at this level that the PRA comes
into its own, particularly through the model of development concept, which can grasp the
ramifications this order of forms poses for the law. Finally, at the most concrete level of
investigation, an understanding must be gained as to how the concrete law of a model of
development simultaneously crystallises its own unique configuration of capitalism’s abstract
tendencies, and relates to the trajectories of crisis it opens.
This methodology is suitable both as a total method of legal analysis and a more specific
inquiry into various substructures of law. Labour law, as the crucial juridical moment in the
commodification of labour-power, is particularly worthy of such an inquiry.

Labour law under capitalism-structure and struggle in the abstract
Unlike previous class systems, the economic and extra-economic moments of exploitation
within capitalism are temporally and spatially divisible (Wood, 2003: 9-14). This substitutes
mediated, impersonal and bureaucratic relations of exploitation in place of the personal bonds
of dependency that characterised slave and feudal societies, as well as separating producers
from their means of subsistence (Poulantzas, 1978: 63-65, 86-87; Kay & Mott, 1982: 81-83;
Wood, 2003: 9-25). Capitalism, moreover, is a mode of production premised upon the
universalisation of market relations. Although the market has been an ancillary institution in
human societies ever since production outstripped subsistence needs, it is only within
capitalism that market trade becomes the beginning point and destination of all economic
activity (Polanyi, 1944: 43). As Marx (1990: 178) noted, the enormous expansion of
commodity relations entailed by capital requires mutual recognition of proprietary right on
the part of commodity buyers and sellers; the violence and robbery that characterised feudal
society, for example, would not be commensurable with the day-to-day conduct of a market
system. This order, in turn, must formally be beyond the ability of any one commodity
owner or seller to corrupt for their own purpose (Pashukanis, 1978: 138-144).viii This reality
is the material basis of the legal form; a framework of social relations characterised by
abstract, universal and formal norms that together comprise an axiomatic system (Poulantzas,
1978: Kay & Mott, 1982; Fine, 1984). At a certain stage of development, this form becomes
merged with the capitalist state, a related though distinct form also implanted in capitalism’s
DNA (Fine, 1984: 146-154). As Fine (1984: 134-154) notes, these are both considered
juridic forms of capitalism, distinct from capital as an economic form yet equally rooted in
the capitalist mode of production.ix
Labour law, derived from this abstract form, is responsible for ensuring the continued
reproduction of labour-power as a commodity (Kay & Mott, 1982: 110-113), reiterating

Thompson’s (1977: 261) point that law is deeply imbricated within production relations.
Within its fabric, however, there exists an insoluble contradiction; that between reconciling
the formal equality of commodity exchange (Pashukanis, 1978: 62-64) with the reality of
exploitation (Kay & Mott, 1982: 111, 119). The result is a legal order that is shot through
with all the tensions of capitalist social relations (Kay & Mott, 1982: 111). The integration of
a collective historical subject (the proletariat) into the legal process ensures the law itself
becomes an arena of class struggle in which the competing political economies of labour and
capital struggle for the higher ground.
Kay & Mott (1982: 131-133) have plotted this process as a ‘law-administration’ continuum.
The growth of working-class power ensures that the capitalist state is forced to put out the
spot-fires of proletarian struggle through the development of administrative fixes, ad hoc
responses that supplement the universality of law through addressing specific issues (Kay &
Mott, 1982: 132). Although initially distinct from law, these are given legal form and come
to be part of a legal-administrative totality.
Given the tendency of different modes of development to crystallise capitalist contradictions
in distinct hierarchised patterns, and the different potentialities this opens for the exercise and
integration of working-class power, it follows that the trajectory and substance of this
continuum will be both a product and a presupposition of the model of development of which
it is part.
Antipodean Fordism and labour law
As mentioned previously, the site of primary contradiction within Fordism was the wagelabour nexus, the process of socialisation of productive activity within capitalism (Boyer,
2002: 73-74). More specifically, Fordism encoded this wage-labour nexus into a distinct
form, namely, the growth of real wages and employment security in line with expected

productivity increases and the intensification of labour (Bertrand, 2002; 80-82; Boyer, 2002:
75). For this nexus to function, a set of distinct legal and institutional conditions were
required, namely those that allowed for the diffusion of wage increases from highproductivity ‘lead sectors,’ permitted collective and ‘connective’ bargaining (Boyer, 1990: x),
encouraged the organisation of labour and developed a notion of the ‘standard,’ full-time
employment contract (Burgess & Campbell, 1998: 33). These could be considered the
abstract features of labour law appropriate to the Fordist model of development.
Antipodean Fordism was unique in terms of the precocious institutionalisation of this nexus.
Indeed, in the materiality of the compulsory conciliation and arbitration system it exceeded
the ideal-typical model in terms of the integration of labour into the state and the law. The
Australian system of conciliation and arbitration was complex, but could broadly be
described as a set of quasi-judicial, formally neutral arbitral tribunals that could compulsorily
determine disputes between employers and unions, with the resulting determinations called
awards.x This structure proved exceedingly adept at articulating real wages and productivity
growth within key sectors and then, through the machinery of the award system, diffusing
these gains throughout the labour force. Such a mechanism is a key moment in the Fordist
mode of regulation. The stability of effective demand, and with it the stability of Fordist
intensive accumulation, depended upon the coherence and (relative) homogeneity of the wage
structure (Boyer, 2001:165). This coherence was ensured by institutions linking highproductivity ‘lead’ sectors with the economy and labour force at large. In Australia, the
arbitration system was better placed to deliver these outcomes than in other Fordist countries,
largely through the pyramidal structure of the award system.
Cochrane (1988) observes the process at play in the post-War years, with militant unions in
the metal trades, mining and stevedoring applying ‘plant by plant duress’ to individual
employers; concessions, once granted, could ‘flow-on’ to other sectors of the economy. This

was particularly the case with the metals industry, an archetypal Fordist lead sector. Well
into the late-1960s, the Metal Trades Award was at the apex of the award system, with
tribunal decisions about wage margins for skill being founded upon it. Respondents to other
federal awards would then have their own award varied accordingly, whilst state tribunals
would generally follow the lead of their federal counterpart. Even after the advent of the
‘Total Wage’ in 1967 (which abolished the traditional practice of determining a ‘Basic Wage’
and wage margins separately), the metals sector was at the forefront of wage increases and
flow-ons and was a key site of the wage explosion of the early-1970s (Bramble, 2008: 4171).
This tendency for the Fordist wage-labour nexus to take root in the Australian arbitration
system was further expedited by the notion of ‘comparative wage justice,’ which enshrined
the view that equal work should be equally recompensed regardless of industrial location
(Provis, 1986: 25). Such an ideology was a powerful force of wage homogeneity when
inserted into the fabric of the award system.
Another element of antipodean Fordism that directly shaped the modality of labour law was
its unification of the economic and social policy goals of the Australian KWNS. Unlike
many other Fordist countries, where a comprehensive system of social support married to a
large public sector was used to deliver the government’s welfare objectives, the Australian
state (in both its Federal and State forms) used the arbitration system as a vehicle to deliver
both economic and social policy. It was this reality that led to Castles’ (1994) description of
the ‘wage-earners welfare state,’ in which the keys to the state’s redistributive and social
support functions were gained through industrial citizenship. With the dissemination of
‘occupational welfare benefits’ (Castles, 1994: 127-128) through the award system, the
Australian KWNS, in concert with the dominance of manufacturing under intensive

accumulation, tended to produce the relatively homogenous, compressed wage structure
typical of Fordism.
The fact that the mode of regulation peculiar to the antipodean Fordism largely subsumed the
economic and social functions of the KWNS into the quasi-judicial system of wage
regulation heightened the fundamentally contradictory nature of labour law explicated by
Kay and Mott (1982: 111). That antipodean Fordism combined this necessarily contradictory
structure with broader social and economic imperatives could not help but exacerbate this
tension, particularly insofar as it encouraged an identity of economic/social performance with
the regulation of the labour market. This was a tendency that pronounced itself strongly in
the crisis of antipodean Fordism from the mid-1970s onwards, where the source of malaise
was often located in the award system and trade union militancy.
Labour law under antipodean Fordism was also influenced by the latter’s encouragement of
moderate trade unionism, itself one of the purposes of the original Conciliation and
Arbitration Act 1904 (s2(vi)). The arbitration system itself can be viewed as an
institutionalised class compromise between labour and capital (Lloyd, 2002: 238), one that
fixed a pronounced institutional role for labour within the fabric of labour law. Indeed,
Justice Higgins, the famous second President of the original Court of Conciliation and
Arbitration, (1915: 23) had noted that ‘without unions, it is hard to conceive how arbitration
could be worked.’ The integration of organised labour into the labour law system was itself
contradictory, however, in the sense that it placed the union movement in a position whereby
it could use its strength to extract concessions from the state (Heino, 2013: 158-159).
Throughout the post-War years, this often saw the state putting out the spot-fires of workingclass discontent, which ranged from campaigns for a reduction in work hours, higher pay,
gender equality, occupational health and safety improvements and industrial democracy
(Bramble, 2008: 46-62). The administrative fixes this entailed constantly threatened to

abrade the power of capital and the stability of accumulation. In the full employment
economy of post-War Fordism, this reality contained latent within it the potential of
arbitration becoming maladaptive for capital. Indeed, the nature of the arbitration system
itself during the Fordist era was a hallmark of the intensified power of proletarian struggle,
with the strict judicial workings of the tribunal abandoned in a series of amendments in 1947
and 1956, which encouraged less formalism and greater specialist input through the
appointment of ‘lay’ commissioners (Frazer, 2002: 29-32).xi In the event, dysfunction set in
through the trade union movement subverting arbitration through collective over-award
bargaining, often at the shopfloor level (Dabscheck, 1994: 146-150; Bramble, 2008: 69).
This usurpation of one of the key institutions of antipodean Fordism was one of the levers of
its crisis.
In short, the features of the order of labour law appropriate to antipodean Fordism reflected
and crystallised its unique structuring of capitalism’s contradictions, particularly its
construction of the wage-labour nexus. In practice, the elements of the system - namely
compulsory arbitration, encouragement of moderate unionism, the unification of wage and
social objectives and the growth of administrative fixes to worker power - ensured its
coherence whilst also containing disequilibria. The crisis of antipodean Fordism from the
mid-1970s onwards was simultaneously the crisis of this order of labour law.
Liberal-productivism and labour-law
Liberal-productivism reorders the abstract contradictions of capitalism, both in terms of their
significance vis-à-vis others and their concretisation in new structures. A key change is the
inversion of the Fordist wage-labour nexus, which is reconstructed as a cost of international
production (Jessop, 2013: 18). This inversion, together with the destruction of the
manufacturing base of domestic intensive accumulation (Ivanova, 2011: 339) saw the

association between productivity and real wage growth that Fordism had fostered destroyed,
reducing the relevance of productivity gains in dynamic sectors to the wage structure at large.
Instead, the gap between increased productivity and stagnating real wages was pocketed by
capitalists (Cowgill, 2013: 2-6). For this to be achieved, the institutions of the antipodean
Fordist wage-labour nexus had to be modified or dismantled, particularly those elements that
afforded labour the opportunity to leverage gains won in key sectors to the workforce at
large. The fragmentation and decentralisation of bargaining and the destruction of the
pyramidal structure of the award system (whereby developments in pace-setting awards
tended to result in derivative adjustments in other awards) are key moments in the
substitution of a liberal-productivist labour law regime in place of its Fordist predecessor.
The need to hamstring the ability of organised labour to make common cause is also a result
of the inversion of the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus. The dysfunction of the latter
manifested itself in a wave of industrial militancy in the late-1960s and early-1970s which
often pressed against and outside the established legal and administrative channels (Bramble,
2008: 41-71). The threat this posed to the continued valorisation of capital, and the related
strain this placed on the state’s ability to formalise labour-power, necessitated mechanisms by
which the unification and solidarity of the proletariat (a development that Fordism
continually tends toward: Aglietta, 1979: 121) could be disrupted. Labour law, at the
forefront of the commodification of labour-power and the construction of labour as a subject,
is crucial in this endeavour. This tendency was the driving force behind a legal climate that
became increasingly hostile towards trade unionism, firstly by breaking the most militant
sections of organised labour (such as the deregistration of the powerful Builder’s Labourers
Federation in 1986) and then through gradually severing the institutionalised links between
trade unionism and the conduct of industrial relations. It is in this light that the movement
towards the individualisation of workplace relations must be read (Gould, 2010).

The decline of working-class power that has generally been a feature of liberal-productivism
is itself a force that impinges upon the form and content of the labour law regime. As Kay
and Mott (1982: 132-133) note, the growth of proletarian power forces the state to formalise
labour-power through new and creative administrative fixes. The greater the collective
power and mobilisation of the working-class, the more the state is compelled to resort to such
fixes to ensure the continued reproduction of wage labour. The erosion of trade union power
and the intensified atomisation of the proletariat into competing units agglomerated around
separate capitals reduces the ability of the working-class to pressure the state in this fashion;
administrative fixes give way to an increasing penetration of the legal form narrowly
construed, the form in which capital has always operated most comfortably. In the Australian
experience of liberal-productivism, this reality has seen a continual state retreat from direct
administrative regulation of the labour market, partly substituted by an increasing
juridifcation of work relations that constructs the labour-capital relationship in the fetishised
image of abstract, de-classed juridical equals engaged in mutually beneficial exchange
(Poulantzas, 1978: 86-87). Juridification, which I construct as the subsumption of
administrative fixes beneath the abstract legal form, is, on this score, merely the concrete
expression of the reduced need of the state to spawn institutional fixes to proletarian struggle.
It also represents a reconfiguration of the law-administration continuum in which the centre
of balance is shifted towards law.
This legal fetish was most graphically demonstrated by the conservative Howard
Government’s creation of statutory individual contracts in 1996, dubbed Australian
Workplace Agreements. Such agreements essentially opted employees out of the award
system (subject to a weak ‘No-Disadvantage’ test),xii with collectively determined awards
(often overseen by specific trade unions) being supplanted by simplified, often pro forma,
individual arrangements that often cut pay and conditions (Peetz, 2006: 85-115). Although

phased out after the Labor Party won office in 2007, AWAs had inflicted grievous damage in
key areas of union strength, particularly mining, and had marginalised the federal arbitral
tribunal (then called the Australian Industrial Relations Commission) and the collectivist
industrial relations it represented.
Juridification is organically related to the increased valency of market forces within the
liberal-productivist model of development consequent upon its explicit positioning of
competition as a principle of social organisation (Petit, 1999: 229-233). The advent of this
mode has seen a hitherto unprecedented commodification of areas of social life previously
insulated from the commodity form (Ivanova, 2011: 340, 347). Despite his inadequate
conception of labour law, Pashukanis (1978) was correct in highlighting the role of exchange
relations in the development of a legal form characterised by abstraction and formal equality.
The greater the colonisation of market forces within all elements of the social body, the more
important will be the purpose of law in providing a ‘medium of association’ between
commodity purchasers and sellers (Fine, 1984: 142).xiii
Within the framework of Australian liberal-productivism, this process of juridification has
tended towards the diminution/destruction of the quasi-administrative configuration of labour
law and its replacement by a more generalist regime that both enshrines individual rights over
and above collective rights and channels labour disputes through the courts of common law
or a weakened tribunal (Ludeke, 1998: 869). In the 1980s and 1990s, this process manifested
itself as an increasing sidelining of the arbitral tribunals, with militant employers at
Mudginberri, Dollar Sweets and Australian Airlines (to name several notable examples)
breaking trade union power through the imposition of archaic common-law industrial torts
and the use of statutory secondary boycott prohibitions. Indeed, the severe 1998 maritime
dispute (sparked by Patrick Stevedores efforts, supported by the Howard Government, to
deunionise the waterfront) proceeded almost entirely through the Federal and High Court

system, as opposed to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. From the 1990s
onwards, the labour law structure itself came to be transformed, as the state sought to recast
the labour market as no different to any other commodity market. This process, lubricated by
over a decade of conservative government rule,xiv culminated in the Workplace Relations
Amendment (WorkChoices) Act 2005 (‘WorkChoices’), which essentially recast the
constitutional basis of Federal Government workplace regulationxv and rendered the federal
arbitral tribunal a toothless tiger.
It is true that the succeeding Labor government’s Fair Work Act 2009 does dispense ‘with the
more egregious manifestations of individualisation introduced by the Howard Government’
(Creighton, 2011: 142) and makes the operating environment of trade unions somewhat less
harsh than it was under WorkChoices. However, the species of collectivism it encourages is
a parochial one, centred on the enterprise and enshrining the individual worker as the
repository of many ostensibly collective rights (Creighton, 2011: 142-144). It follows
WorkChoices in relegating trade unions to one of a number of participants in the conduct of
industrial relations (Hardy & Howe, 2009: 323), which addresses the dysfunction of the
Fordist wage-labour nexus by disrupting the unification of the proletariat (Aglietta, 1979:
121). In short, contra suggestions that the Fair Work Act represents a re-collectivisation of
Australian labour law, it is better conceived as part of the experimental ‘roll-out’ of liberalproductivist structures (Peck, 2010: 22-23) whereby the needs of the new model of
development are reconciled with the limits of political legitimacy (O’Connor, 1973).
Lastly, the decline of the antipodean Fordist mode of regulation, and its unique combination
of economic and social policy objectives under the aegis of the arbitration system, has led to
a usurpation of the predominance of labour law in constituting labour-power (although this
remains its sole abstract aim). Liberal-productivism’s attack upon the precocious antipodean
Fordist wage-labour nexus has fundamentally crippled the ability of this nexus to deliver

wide-ranging policy goals. In its place there has arisen a more functionally differentiated
welfare system and a wage relationship that is increasingly sensitive to legal regulation
outside of labour law narrowly construed. For example, occupational health and safety law,
conditions attached to welfare provision and the law of contractual association between
business units are now important determinants of industrial outcomes for Australian workers.
This reality has been grasped empirically by the Australian ‘Labour Market Regulation
Approach,’ albeit in a theoretically impoverished way.
In place of antipodean Fordism, liberal-productivism unleashes forces that attack the efficacy
and solidarity of collective labour through a reformulation of the wage-labour nexus, reduce
the need of the state to develop administrative fixes to class struggle and increase the valency
of market forces through an extension of the commodity form. These both constitute, and are
constituted by, the qualitatively distinct labour law regime of liberal-productivism.
Conclusions
This paper attempts to apprehend in a theoretically rigorous manner the nature of the changes
in Australian labour law over the past several decades. This is achieved through a process
that begins with the abstract functions of law generally, and labour law specifically, within
capitalist social relations. It is at this level that most Marxist accounts of the law have
operated.
In order to understand at a more concrete level the manifestations of these abstract forms in
the Australian context, the concepts and methodology of the PRA are deployed, modifying
regulationist ideal-typical models of development to take into account the idiosyncrasies of
the Australian experience. Based upon their ordering of the contradictions of capitalist social
relations, the nature of organised labour’s insertion into the institutional fabric, the
potentialities for the exercise of collective labour’s power and the valency of market forces,

antiopodean Fordism and liberal-productivism both fix the abstract function of labour law
and the legal form in distinct concrete structures. This understanding is critical in both
exposing the causal relationships linking law to the evolution of Australian capitalism and
identifying opportunities to mobilise counter-strategies to the disempowering (for labour)
nature of legal change over recent decades. This latter point is especially significant when it
is realised that liberal-productivism is, like any arrangement of capitalist social relations,
unstable and dialectically evolving. Although it has addressed some of the key crisis
tendencies of antipodean Fordism, it sets in motion others, particularly the threat of
underconsumption consequent upon stagnating earnings and a polarised wage structure
(Vidal, 2013: 468). Moreover, the fact that Australian labour is less thoroughly integrated
into the institutional architecture of the state and its labour law regime could potentially open
up pathways to new and dynamic forms of working class struggle, particularly considering
the bureaucratic trade unionism arbitration encouraged.
More broadly, the analytical synthesis between the PRA and a sophisticated Marxist
understanding of law provides a model of legal theorising that can be applied in other
contexts to capture the dynamic, dialectical relationship between capital’s abstract juridic
forms and their historical crystallisation.
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Notes

i

It still remains a fair observation, however, that the law itself has generally been of peripheral interest to
Marxist work generally.
ii
Indeed, many of these debates have been played out in the pages of this journal. See, for example, Bonefeld
(1987), Jessop (1988) and Holloway (1988). I do not intend to reopen this debate; suffice it to say here that I
find myself in agreement with the regulationist articulation of structure and strategy (Jessop, 1988: 156-159),
its retroductive ontology and epistemology (Jessop & Sum, 2006: 300-304) and above all the method of
articulating capitalism’s long-run tendencies with its intermediate trajectories (Neilson, 2012: 160).
iii
Neilson (2012: 161) is completely correct in drawing attention to the increasing eclecticism of the PRA under
the ideological leadership of Robert Boyer. In a 2002 collection detailing the state of the regulationist
program, one short chapter was devoted to the school’s linkages with Marxism, and that was as concerned
with distancing the school from its Marxist heritage as embracing it (Nadel, 2002). Moreover, in seeking
rapprochement with the VOC school, Boyer has essentially destroyed the regulationist notion of Fordism
through confusing ideal-typical models with their concrete application (Boyer, 2005: 514-516).
iv
It is important to note, however, the limitation of the concept. It is certainly not reducible to massproduction and government intervention in the economy, which appears to inform the description of post-war
industrialisation in developing countries as ‘peripheral Fordism’ (Jessop & Sum, 2006: 156-160).
v
This explicit construction of antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism in-line with discrete PRA concepts is
what separates the approach taken in this paper from other regulationist-influenced Australian scholarship.
Broomhill (2008) and Lloyd (2002, 2008), whilst inspired in part by regulationist concepts and methodology,
are more eclectic, amorphous and lack the neat analytical structure inherent in the model of development
concept. This in part derives from ascribing to the PRA a supposed economistic perspective. Whilst perhaps
true as a matter of historical focus (Jessop & Sum, 2006: 43-44), it does not reflect any inherent limitation of
the approach. Instead, this asymmetrical perspective must be corrected by a deepening and intensification of
the PRA method.
vi
This is the proper starting point of any rigorous regulationist analysis. Jessop & Sum rightly argues that the
increasing eclecticism of the school threatens this methodology (2006: 244-245).
vii
Although Pashukanis correctly identified that the law’s form is a product of the social relations into which it
is embedded, he focussed exclusively on exchange relations as the source of this form, which runs counter to
Marx’s emphasis on the predominance of production relations.
viii
This is not to suggest that groups of capitalists cannot corrupt the legal order to further their ends.
However, this understanding is incidental to a formal understanding of law within capitalism. Echoing Marx’s
effort to understand the labour theory of value through commodities being sold at their value (Marx, 2004:
104), we must comprehend ‘unadulterated’ law in its class terms if we are to explain the link between law and
capital in anything more than an incidental fashion.
ix
In this regard Fine’s (1984) conceptualisation is to be preferred to Jessop’s. Although Jessop acknowledges
the necessity of starting analysis with the contradictions of the capital relation (2013: 6-9), this understanding
sits uneasily with his notion of the ‘ecological dominance’ capital generally exerts over other ‘sub-systems’,
including the law (Jessop & Sum, 2006: 284-287). At a theoretical level, such a conception would seem to
demand that these other sub-systems are logically prior to, or independent of, capitalist social relations,
whose dominance is a contingent, provisional matter. Such a view runs counter to Marx’s effort to explain a
mode of production as a totality, a totality internally differentiated by economic, political and ideological
forces which are nevertheless grounded in the same matrix of social relations.
x
For the Federal Government, the power of compulsory arbitration resides in s 51(35) of the Australian
Constitution.
xi
This point demonstrates how it is useful to consider administration as a practice as well as a series of
structures. If Kay & Mott (1982) err, it is in emphasising the latter view.
xii
This test provided that an AWA could not undercut the relevant award. In practice the test was weakly
applied, and was removed altogether under the WorkChoices legislation.
xiii
The intensification of the competition principle also informs the increasing dismemberment of internal
labour markets and corporate short-termism as Australian, and world, capitalism becomes increasingly
financialised, a function of liberal-productivism being unable to solve periodic crisis of overproduction
(Kettell, 2006). This is highly significant for the structure of the wage-labour nexus, but space prevents

further consideration here.
xiv
The conservative Liberal Party/National Party Coalition ruled from 1996-2007.
xv
WorkChoices recast workplace regulation as a product of the corporations power (s51(20) of the
Constitution) in place of the arbitral power. This enormously expanded the breadth of federal regulation at
the same time it destroyed one hundred years of constitutional practice.
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